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Experiences,	  by	  definition,	  have	  phenomenal	  character.	  But	  many	  experiences	  have	  a	  specific	  
type	   of	   phenomenal	   character:	   presentational	   character.	   While	   both	   visual	   experience	   and	  
conscious	   thought	  make	  us	  aware	  of	   their	  objects,	  only	   in	  visual	  experience	  do	  objects	   seem	  
present	   before	   the	   mind	   and	   available	   for	   direct	   access.	   I	   argue	   that	   Higher-­‐Order	   Thought	  




1	  	  	  	  PRELIMINARIES	  	  	  	  
	  
Higher-­‐Order	  Awareness	  (HOA)	  theories	  of	  consciousness	  claim	  that	  for	  any	  mental	  state	  m	  of	  a	  
subject	   S,	   m	   is	   conscious—i.e.	   has	   some	   phenomenal	   character	   or	   other—only	   if	   S	   bears	   a	  
higher-­‐order	  awareness-­‐of	  relation	  m*	  to	  m.1	  Individual	  HOA	  theories	  primarily	  depart	  over	  (i)	  
whether	   the	   awareness-­‐of	   relation	   is	   representational	   or	   an	   acquaintance	   relation	   (and	   if	  
representational,	   is	   it	   thought-­‐like	   or	   perception-­‐like?);	   and	   (ii)	   whether	   the	   relationship	  
between	  m*	  and	  the	  lower-­‐order	  state	  m	  is	  non-­‐constitutive	  or	  constitutive	  (and	  if	  constitutive,	  
is	   m*	   identical	   to	   m,	   or	   a	   proper	   part	   of	   m?).	   The	   major	   players—Higher-­‐Order	   Thought	  
Theories	   (e.g.	   Rosenthal	   2005),	   Higher-­‐Order	   Perception	   Theories	   (e.g.	   Lycan	   1996),	   Self-­‐
Representational	   Theories	   (e.g.	   Kriegel	   2009,	  Gennaro	  2011),	   and	  Higher-­‐Order	  Acquaintance	  
Theories	  (e.g.	  Hellie	  2007)—are	  split	  on	  these	  points.2	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I	  will	  use	  the	  terms	  ‘awareness’	  and	  ‘consciousness’	  (and	  their	  cognates)	  interchangeably.	  	  
2 	  Two	   points	   are	   worth	   clarifying	   here.	   First,	   in	   claiming	   that	   the	   awareness-­‐of	   relation	   is	   an	  
acquaintance	  relation,	  Hellie	  (2007)	  means	  that	  it	  is	  non-­‐intentional.	  According	  to	  Hellie,	  for	  relation	  to	  
be	   intentional	   is	   for	   it	   to	  be	  such	   that	  sometimes,	  among	   its	   relata	  are	  merely	   intentionally	   inexistent	  
entities.	   In	  this	  sense,	  Hellie	  has	  us	  consider	  knowing-­‐of	  as	  a	  non-­‐intentional	  relation:	  if	  John	  knows	  of	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   My	  focus	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  with	  Higher-­‐Order	  Thought	  theories	  (HOT).	  HOT	  is	  perhaps	  the	  
best-­‐known	   variant	   of	   HOA	   theory.	   It	   can	   be	   stated	   as	   follows:	   for	   any	  mental	   state	  m	   of	   a	  
subject	  S,	  m	  is	  conscious	  iff	  S	  has	  a	  mental	  representation	  m*	  of	  herself	  as	  being	  m,	  where	  m*	  
is	  an	  assertoric,	  non-­‐inferential,	  occurrent	  higher-­‐order	   thought	   (i.e.	  a	  HOT).3	  There	  are	  other	  
ways	   to	   frame	   HOT,	   but	   this	   is	   the	   traditional	   formulation.	   Hence	   call	   this	   the	   traditional	  
formulation	  of	  HOT.4,	  5	  
My	   aim	   is	   to	   explore	   HOT’s	   compatibility	   with	   a	   type	   of	   phenomenal	   character:	  
presentational	  character.	  Phenomenal	  characters	  are	  properties	  that	  type	  experiences	  by	  what	  
it	   is	   like	   for	   the	   subject	   to	  have	   them.	  Presentational	   character,	  being	  a	   type	  of	  phenomenal	  
character,	  types	  experiences	  by	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  have	  them,	  but	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  	  	  
Not	  all	  experiences	  have	  presentational	  character.	  Moods,	  like	  ‘free-­‐floating’	  anxiety,	  do	  
not.	   There	   is	   something	   it	   is	   like	   to	   be	   anxious,	   but	   in	   being	   anxious,	   especially	   when	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  Wright	   Brothers’	   first	   flight,	   it	   follows	   that	   the	  Wright	   Brothers’	   first	   flight	   is	   real.	   (Of	   course,	   as	  
Hellie	  concedes,	  knowing-­‐of	  bares	  a	  metaphysical	  connecting	  to	  intentional	  relations	  of	  awareness	  since	  
knowing-­‐of	  entails	  believing-­‐in).	  On	  Hellie’s	  acquaintance	  theory,	  then,	  m*	  is	  a	  non-­‐intentional	  relation	  
of	   awareness	   like	   knowing-­‐of.	   	   Second,	  when	   the	   relation	   between	  m*	   and	  m	   is	   a	   constitutive,	   part-­‐
whole	  relation,	  the	  relevant	  notion	  of	  parthood,	  as	  Kriegel	  points	  out,	  is	  logical	  parthood,	  not	  spatial	  or	  
temporal	  (2006:	  146).	  For	  instance,	  when	  John	  stands	  in	  the	  relation	  of	  fear	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  
zomvbie	  apaoclyspe	  is	  immanent,	  John	  necessarily	  also	  statnds	  in	  the	  belief-­‐relation	  to	  the	  proposition	  it	  
is	  possible	  that	  the	  zombie	  apocalypse	  is	  immanent;	  John’s	  belief,	  as	  Kriegel	  puts	  it,	  is	  not	  something	  in	  
addition	  to	  his	  fear,	  but	  is	  some	  how	  inherent	  in	  it	  (ibid).	  	  Likewise,	  on	  this	  version	  of	  HOA,	  our	  awarness	  
of	  our	  concious	  states	  in	  a	  logical	  part	  of	  those	  concious	  states.	  
3	  This	   assumes	   that	   consciousness	   is	   a	   property	   of	   states.	   This	   is	   almost	   always	   how	   HOT—and	   all	  
variants	  of	  HOA	  theory,	  for	  that	  matter—is	  formulated,	  and	  I	  will	  assume	  this	  throughout.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  
include	  it	  in	  the	  ‘traditional’	  formulation	  of	  HOT.	  However,	  as	  considerations	  regarding	  cases	  of	  ‘empty	  
HOTs’	   often	   reveal,	  whether	   this	   is	   the	  best	  way	   to	  understand	  HOT	   is	   an	  open	  matter.	   For	   instance,	  
Berger	  (2014)	  and	  Brown	  (2015)	  have	  each	  argued	  for	  a	  different	  construal	  of	  HOT	  based	  largely	  on	  this	  
issue.	   (e.g.,	   that	   consciousness	   is	   not	   a	   property	   of	   states,	   but	   a	   property	   of	   individuals).	   However,	  
nothing	  in	  what	  follows	  will	  turn	  on	  these	  alternatives.	  What	  is	  of	  issue	  is	  how	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  
determined,	  and	  both	  follow	  what	  I	  am	  calling	  ‘traditional’	  HOT	  in	  this	  regard	  (See	  also	  fn.	  14).	  
4	  Going	  forward,	  I	  drop	  ‘traditional’.	  Context	  will	  make	  clear	  when	  I	  depart	  from	  this	  usage.	  	  
5	  I	  will	  use	  ‘HOT’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  theory,	  and	  expressions	  like	  ‘a	  HOT’,	  ‘her	  HOT’,	  ‘the	  HOT’,	  ‘empty	  HOTs’,	  	  
etc.	  to	  refer	  to	  m*,	  i.e.	  the	  state	  of	  HOA	  awareness	  or	  HOT	  itself	  implicated	  by	  HOT	  (the	  theory).	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anxiousness	   is	   free-­‐floating	   and	   not	   obviously	   about	   something,	   we	   (or	   our	   state	   of	   being	  
anxious)	  do	  not	   instantiate	  a	  presentational	  character,	  even	   if	  we	  (or	  our	  state)	   instantiates	  a	  
phenomenal	   character	   of	   some	   other	   kind.	   But	   many	   experiences	   do	   have	   presentational	  
character.	   Compare	  having	   a	   conscious	   thought	   about	   The	  White	  House	  with	  having	   a	   visual	  
experience	  of	  The	  White	  House.	  In	  both	  cases,	  I	  am	  in	  a	  mental	  state	  that	  has	  The	  White	  House	  
as	  its	  object.	  In	  both	  cases,	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  this	  object.	  Even	  so,	  there	  is	  a	  vast	  phenomenological	  
difference	   in	  the	  way	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  The	  White	  House	  when	  thinking	  compared	  to	  the	  way	   in	  
which	   I	   am	   aware	   of	   The	  White	   House	   when	   having	   a	   visual	   experience.	   In	   having	   a	   visual	  
experience	  there	  is	  a	  phenomenological	  sense	  in	  which	  The	  White	  House	  is	  directly	  present	  for	  
the	   subject	   that	   is	   absent	   in	   conscious	   thought.	   An	   experience	   has	   presentational	   character	  
when	   its	   object	   seems	   directly	   present	   in	   this	   sense	   (cf.	   Valberg	   1992;	   Sturgeon	   2000).6	  
Sometimes,	   I	   will	   say	   use	   the	   expression	   ‘phenomenally	   presents’—that	   an	   experience	  
‘phenomenally	  presents	   its	  object’.	   This	   is	   just	   another	  way	  of	   saying	   that	   an	  experience	  has	  
presentational	  character	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  object.	  	  
HOT	  has	  a	  problem	  with	  presentational	  character,	  I	  will	  contend,	  because	  if	  HOT	  is	  true	  
no	  experiences	  have	  presentational	  character.	  So	  at	  its	  most	  general,	  my	  argument	  is	  this:	  
P1 If	  HOT	  is	  true,	  no	  experiences	  have	  presentational	  character.	  
P2 But	  some	  experiences	  do	  have	  presentational	  character.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ∴ 	  	  	  HOT	  is	  false.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Scott	  Sturgeon	  refers	  to	  this	  aspect	  of	  visual	  phenomenal	  character	  as	  “scene-­‐immediacy,”	  telling	  us:	  	  
	  
Its	  phenomenology	  will	  be	  as	  if	  a	  scene	  is	  made	  manifest	  to	  you.	  This	  is	  the	  most	  striking	  aspect	  of	  
visual	   experience…Visual	   phenomenology	   makes	   it	   for	   subject	   as	   if	   a	   scene	   is	   simply	   presented.	  
Veridical	   perception	   illusion	   and	   hallucination	   seem	   to	   place	   objects	   and	   their	   features	   directly	  
before	  the	  mind	  (2000:9)	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I	  assume	  P2.7	  The	  paper’s	  central	  aim,	  then,	  is	  to	  defend	  P1.	  Let	  me	  be	  upfront	  about	  how	  I	  see	  
the	   dialectic.	   While	   it	   is	   simple	   enough	   to	   make	   presentational	   phenomenology	   salient	   by	  
examples,	  offering	  a	   theory	   is	   another	  matter	   (cf.	  Chudnoff	  2012).	   Even	   the	  naïve	   realist,	   for	  
whom	   phenomenal	   character	   is	   constituted	   by	   a	   perceiver	   standing	   in	   a	   relation	   of	  
acquaintance	  to	  particular	  physical	  things	  and	  their	  properties,	  can	  only	  tell	  part	  of	  the	  story	  if,	  
as	   I’ll	   assume,	   hallucinations	   have	   presentational	   character	   too.8	  Presentational	   character,	   in	  
short,	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  everyone.	  
	   These	   facts	   put	   constraints	   on	   the	   charges	  we	   can	   reasonably	   impute	   against	   HOT	   and	  
how	  P1	   can	  be	  defended.	   For	   if	   no	  one	  has	   a	   satisfying	   full-­‐fledged	   theory	  of	   presentational	  
character—if	   no	   one	   has	   of	   yet	   given	   us,	   say,	   satisfying	   reductive	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	  
conditions	  for	  when	  a	  mental	  state	  has	  presentational	  character—that	  HOT	  does	  not	  either	   is	  
par	   for	   the	   course.	   Yet	  while	   it	  may	  not	   be	   fair	   to	   expect	  HOT	   to	  account	   for	   presentational	  
character,	   it	   is	   fair	   to	  expect	  HOT	  to	  be	  able	  to	  accommodate	  presentational	  character.	  For	   if	  
HOT	  makes	  it	  such	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  an	  experience	  to	  have	  presentational	  character,	  that	  
does	  place	  HOT	  at	  a	  relative,	  and	  quite	  serious,	  disadvantage.	  	  	  
	   	   Given	   this,	   I	   suggest	   we	   view	   the	   dialectic	   in	   the	   following	   way.	   Because	   we	   are	   not	  
demanding	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  theory,	  the	  advocate	  of	  HOT	  can	  always	  fall	  back	  on	  what	  one	  might	  
think	  of	  as	  The	  HOT-­‐Theoretic	  Gambit.	  It	  goes	  something	  like	  this:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  A	  word	  about	   scope:	   I	   am	  only	   concerned	  with	  perceptual	  experience,	   specifically	  visual	   experience.	  
Perhaps	  all	  perceptual	  experiences	  have	  (a	  form	  of)	  presentational	  phenomenology,	  or	  even	  some	  non-­‐
perceptual	  experiences	   (Chudnoff	  2012).	   For	  our	  purposes,	  however,	   I	   am	  only	   concerned	  with	  HOT’s	  
ability	  to	  accommodate	  the	  visual	  case.	  	  	  	  	  
8	  While	  the	  naïve	  realist	  is	  often	  assumed	  to	  have	  the	  inside	  track	  on	  presentational	  character,	  this	  is	  not	  
wholly	  uncontroversial.	  For	  instance,	  Boyd	  Millar	  (2014)	  has	  recently	  argued	  that	  naïve	  realist	  views	  are	  
no	   better	   off	   at	   accounting	   for	   presentational	   phenomenology	   than	   (first-­‐order)	   representationalist	  
views.	  For	  another	  attempt	  to	  account	   for	  presentational	  phenomenology	  within	  a	   representationalist	  
framework,	  see	  Schroer	  (2012).	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- 	  	  	  I	  grant	  you	  there	  is	  presentational	  phenomenology.	  This	  much	  is	  undeniable.	  But	  as	  you	  
admit,	   you	   don’t	   know	   what	   makes	   a	   state	   have	   presentational	   character	   instead	   of	  
non-­‐presentational	  phenomenal	  character,	  and	  neither	  do	   I.	  But	   since	  we	  have	  strong	  
antecedent	   reasons	   to	  believe	   in	  HOT,	   there	  must	  be	   something	   in	   the	  HOT-­‐theoretic	  
explanation	   of	   consciousness	   that	   differentiates	   having	   presentational	   character	   from	  
having	  non-­‐presentational	  phenomenal	  character.	  For	  all	  we	  know,	  the	  right	  species	  of	  
thought	  does	  ground	  presentational	  phenomenology,	  and	  HOTs	  is	  that	  species.	  	  
	  
Similar	   gambits	   can	   be	   made	   for	   other	   views	   of	   consciousness:	   The	   First-­‐Order	  
Representationalist-­‐Theoretic	   Gambit,	   The	   Qualia	   Realist-­‐Theoretic	   Gambit,	   and	   so	   on.	   My	  
strategy	   is	   to	  push	  back	  on	   the	  HOT-­‐Theoretic	  Gambit	  by	  pressing	   the	  HOT	   theorist	  on	  what	  
that	   ‘something’	   might	   be.	   Above	   all	   else,	   what	   I	   want	   to	   show	   is	   that	   The	   HOT-­‐Theoretic	  
Gambit	  is—more	  than	  anything	  other	  gambit—a	  bad	  bet.	  Even	  if	  presentational	  character	  is	  a	  
problem	   for	   everyone,	   HOT	   faces	   a	   pernicious	   version	   of	   the	   problem	   because	   it	   cannot	  
accommodate	  presentational	  character.	  HOT	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  presentational	  character.9	  
Here’s	  the	  plan.	  I’ll	  begin	  in	  §	  2	  by	  saying	  a	  bit	  more	  about	  presentational	  character.	  In	  §	  
3	  I’ll	  spell	  out	  some	  of	  the	  more	  germane	  aspects	  of	  HOT,	  and	  articulate	  the	  sub-­‐argument	  for	  
P1.	  The	  first	  cut	  of	  argument	  will	  be	  stated	  rather	  baldly.	  Again,	  the	  reason	  is	  dialectical.	  HOT	  
faces	   a	   unique	   challenge	   in	   accommodating	   presentational	   character.	   On	   HOT,	   the	   sole	  
determinant	  of	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  the	  content	  of	  a	  type	  of	  thought,	  a	  HOT.	  But	  one	  might	  
think	  that	  in	  being	  a	  type	  of	  thought,	  HOTs,	  even	  if	  capable	  of	  making	  us	  aware	  of	  their	  objects,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Let	  me	  forestall	  a	  potential	  worry.	  Given	  how	  we	  have	  formulated	  HOT	  theory,	  one	  might	  wonder:	  how	  
can	  HOTs	  present	  objects	  like	  The	  White	  House	  given	  that	  the	  object	  of	  a	  HOT	  is	  a	  first-­‐order	  state	  m?	  
Though	  it	  is	  tricky	  to	  get	  a	  grip	  on	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  our	  first-­‐order	  states	  on	  HOT,	  the	  
HOT	   theorist	  would	   still	   (presumably)	   allow	   that	   in	  having	   a	   visual	   experience	  of	   The	  White	  House,	   it	  
seems	  as	   if	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  The	  White	  House	   (even	   if	  we	  are	  actually	  aware	  of	  an	  experience	  of	  The	  
White	  House).	  And	  this	  is	  all	  we	  need	  for	  the	  question	  of	  accommodating	  presentational	  character	  to	  be	  
salient.	  I	  thank	  an	  anonymous	  review	  for	  bringing	  this	  point	  to	  my	  attention.	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are	  ipso	  facto	  precluded	  from	  phenomenally	  presenting	  their	  objects.	  Thus,	  HOT	  faces	  a	  puzzle:	  
we	   need	   to	   know	   what	   is	   special	   to	   HOTs	   such	   that	   they	   can	   accommodate	   presentational	  
character	   and	   are	   not,	   as	   it	   were,	  mere	   thoughts.	   So	   I’ll	   state	   the	   argument	   first,	   and	   then	  
explore	  such	  special	  features	  in	  §	  4,	  arguing	  that	  each	  fails:	  no	  feature	  of	  the	  traditional	  HOT-­‐
theoretic	  explanation	  of	  consciousness	  can	  ground	  presentational	  character.	   I	  wrap	  up	   in	  §	  5,	  
exploring	  some	  future	  directions.	  	  
	  
2	  	  	  	  FOUR	  BRIEF	  CLAIMS	  ABOUT	  PRESENTATIONAL	  CHARACTER	  	  	  	  	  
	  
To	  help	  fix	  ideas,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  briefly	  make	  four	  claims	  about	  presentational	  character.	  	  
	   First,	  to	  say	  that	  an	  experience	  has	  presentational	  character	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  it	  only	  has	  
presentational	  character.	  An	  experience’s	  total	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  the	  totality	  of	  what	  it	  
is	   like	   for	   the	   subject	   to	   have	   that	   experience,	   but	   a	   total	   phenomenal	   character	   can	   be	  
constituted	   by	   different	   kinds	   of	   phenomenal	   properties,	   both	   presentational	   and	   non-­‐
presentational.	  Total	  phenomenal	  character,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  heterogeneous.	  For	  this	  reason,	  
the	   persnickety	   way	   of	   putting	   things	   would	   be	   to	   introduce	   the	   locution	   ‘presentational	  
character	  with	  respect	  to	  p’.	  Elijah	  Chudnoff	  (2012:	  56)	  gives	  an	  example	  of	  a	  visual	  experience	  
that	   represents	   your	   friend	   as	   smiling	   and	   as	   happy	   that	   helps	   here.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   there	   is	  
presentational	  character	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  your	  friend	  is	  smiling	  but	  not	  with	  
respect	   to	   the	   proposition	   that	   your	   friend	   is	   happy,	   even	   though	   your	   friend’s	   being	   happy	  
figures	  into	  your	  experience’s	  ‘total’	  phenomenal	  character.	  	  
	   Second,	  it	  was	  said	  that	  experience	  has	  presentational	  character	  when	  its	  object	  seems	  to	  
be	  directly	  present.	  Though	  common	  parlance,	  an	  object’s	   seeming	   to	  be	   ‘directly	  present’	   is	  
ambiguous.	  Consider	  how	  John	  Searle	  describe	  presentational	  character:	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If,	  for	  example,	  I	  see	  a	  yellow	  station	  wagon	  in	  front	  of	  me,	  the	  experience	  I	  have	  is	  directly	  
of	   the	   object.	   It	   doesn't	   just	   ‘represent’	   the	   object;	   it	   provides	   direct	   access	   to	   it.	   The	  
experience	  has	  a	  kind	  of	  directness,	  immediacy	  and	  involuntariness	  which	  is	  not	  shared	  by	  a	  
belief	  I	  might	  have	  about	  the	  object	  in	  its	  absence…The	  visual	  experience	  I	  will	  say	  does	  not	  
just	  represent	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  perceived;	  rather,	  when	  satisfied,	  it	  gives	  direct	  access	  to	  
it,	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  it	  is	  a	  presentation	  of	  that	  state	  of	  affairs.	  (1983:	  46)	  
	  
Notice	   Searle’s	   use	   of	   “directness”	   and	   “immediacy”:	   visual	   awareness	   affords	   us	   a	   form	   of	  
access	   that	   is	   “direct”	   and	   “immediate”	   lacking	   in	   the	   case	   of	   pure	   thought.	   But	   as	   Robert	  
Schroer	  has	  pointed	  out,	  on	  at	  least	  one	  gloss	  this	  way	  of	  putting	  things	  is	  misleading	  (2012).	  To	  
see	  this,	  let’s	  distinguish	  between	  epistemic	  and	  phenomenal	  directness.	  On	  the	  former,	  one’s	  
awareness	  of	  x	  is	  epistemically	  direct	  if	  one’s	  awareness	  of	  x	  is	  not	  mediated	  by	  some	  distinct	  
entity	  y,	  as	  when	  I	  am	  aware	  that	  the	  water	  is	  boiling	  by	  my	  awareness	  of	  the	  teapot	  whistling.	  
Schroer’s	  point	  is	  that	  when	  Searle	  employs	  terms	  like	  “direct”	  and	  “immediate”	  to	  describe	  the	  
presentational	  phenomenology	  that	  is	  unique	  to	  visual	  experience	  he	  is	  not	  claiming	  it	  is	  direct	  
in	   this	   epistemic	   sense.	   For	   thoughts	   can	   also	   confer	   epistemically	   direct	   awareness.	   Rather,	  
what	  Searle	  is	  describing	  is	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  presented	  objects	  seem,	  as	  it	  were,	  right	  there	  or	  
graspable	  in	  a	  way	  the	  objects	  of	  thought	  are	  not.	  In	  this	  sense,	  one’s	  awareness	  of	  presented	  
objects	  is	  phenomenally	  direct.	  
	   	   Third,	  some	  say	  objects	  of	  perception	  are	  presented	  as	  mind-­‐independent	  or	  as	  distinct	  
from	   awareness.	   Millar	   (2014)	   calls	   this	   object-­‐distinctness.	   I	   do	   not	   know	   if	   perceptual	  
experience	   is	   transparent.	   It	   seems	   fairly	   clear,	   however,	   that	   an	   experience’s	   having	  
presentational	  character	  with	  respect	  to	  P	  does	  not	  entail	  object-­‐distinctness	  with	  respect	  to	  P.	  
Millar	  cites	  pressure-­‐phosphene	  experiences	  an	  example.	  According	  to	  Millar,	   in	  such	  cases	   it	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does	  not	  seem	  to	  you	  that	  you	  are	  aware	  of	  something	  that	  has	  an	  existence	  apart	  from	  that	  
experience.	  Still,	  pressure-­‐phosphene	  experiences	  have	  presentational	  character	  (ibid:	  240).	   	  	  	  	  
Fourth,	  some	  claim	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  are	  like	  perfectly	  transparent	  windows;	  
when	  you	  attempt	   to	  attend	  to	  your	  experiences,	  you	  see	  right	   ‘through’	   them,	  and	  the	  only	  
features	   you	   can	   become	   aware	   of	   seem	   to	   be	   features	   of	   your	   ambient	   environment.	   You	  
never	  aware	  of	  what	  seem	  to	  be	  intrinsic	  features	  of	  the	  experience	  itself	  (e.g.	  Harman	  1990;	  
Tye	   2002).	   Following	   common	   parlance,	   let’s	   call	   this	   feature	   transparency.	   I	   do	   not	   know	   if	  
perceptual	  experience	  is	  transparent.	  It	  seems	  fairly	  clear,	  however,	  that	  an	  experience’s	  having	  
presentational	   character	   does	   not	   entail	   that	   it	   is	   transparent.	   Again	   following	   Millar,	  
transparency	   would	   only	   follow	   from	   an	   experience’s	   having	   presentational	   character	   if	   we	  
assumed	  “being	  able	  to	  turn	  one’s	  attention	  to	  a	  feature	  that	  seems	  not	  to	  belong	  to	  objects	  in	  
the	   ambient	   environment	  would	  make	   it	   impossible	   for	   objects	   in	   the	   environment	   to	   seem	  
immediately	  present	  in	  a	  perceptual	  experience”	  (2014:	  241).	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  
assume	   that	   by	  merely	   turning	   your	   attention	   to	   features	   that	   seemed	  not	   to	   belong	   to	   any	  
physical	  objects,	  such	  features	  would	  necessarily,	  as	  Millar	  puts	  it,	  “crowd	  out”	  environmental	  
objects	  (ibid:	  241).	  Like	  Millar,	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  to	  make	  this	  assumption.10	  
Even	   with	   these	   clarificatory	   points,	   some	  may	   still	   find	   the	   notion	   of	   presentational	  
character	   elusive.	   I	   don’t	   know	  how	   to	   convince	   someone	  of	   a	   phenomenological	   claim,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  I	  will	  add	  a	  fifth	  claim,	  but	  only	  as	  an	  aside.	  According	  to	  some,	  being	  presented	  makes	  an	  epistemic	  
difference.	   In	   virtue	   of	   an	   object	   being	   presented	   to	   its	   subject,	   a	   subject	   is	   placed	   in	   a	   position	   to	  
acquire	  non-­‐inferential	  knowledge	  of	   it,	  and	  demonstrative	   reference	   to	   it.	  Mark	   Johnston	   (2006)	  and	  
Chudnoff	   (2012)	   claim	   that	   if	   a	   perceptual	   experience	   justifies	   you	   in	   believing	   that	   p,	   it	   does	   so	   by	  
instantiating	   the	   property	   of	   having	   presentational	   character	  with	   respect	   to	  p.	   I’m	   inclined	   to	   agree	  
with	  Johnston	  and	  Chudnoff,	  but	  will	  remain	  agnostic	  for	  present	  purporses.	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  only	  assume	  
the	  phenomenological	  datum	  that	  is	  presentational	  character,	  not	  any	  of	  its	  epistemic	  ramifications.	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citing	  the	  many	  authors	  who	  have	  evoked	  presentational	  character	  (as	  distinct	  from	  other	  types	  
of	  phenomenal	  character)	  would	  carry	  little	  dialectical	  force	  for	  the	  skeptic.	  	  
To	  the	  unconvinced,	  I	  offer	  the	  following.	  Focus	  on	  the	  visual	  case.	  Then,	  fix	  the	  concept	  
‘presentational	   character’	   in	   purely	   comparative	   terms,	   between	   visual	   experiences	   and	  
occurrent	   thoughts:	   ‘presentational	   character’	   picks	   out	   that	   phenomenological	   quality,	  
whatever	  it	  is,	  that	  marks	  the	  difference	  between	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  an	  object	  O	  by	  
having	  an	  occurrent	  thought	  about	  O	  and	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  an	  object	  O	  by	  having	  a	  
visual	   experience	   of	   O.	   That	   is	   the	   phenomena	   I	   am	   claiming	   to	   be	   incompatible	   with	   the	  
traditional	  HOT-­‐theoretic	  explanation	  of	  consciousness.	  And	  so	   long	  as	  one	  concedes	   there	   is	  
such	  a	  difference	  between	  thinking	  about	  O	  and	  visually	  experiencing	  O,	  we	  should	  have	  a	  fix	  
on	  our	  phenomenon	  of	  interest.	  	  
	  
3	  	  	  	  THE	  ARGUMENT	  	  	  	  	  
	  
In	   any	   event,	   such	   is	   all	   I’ll	   say	   about	   presentational	   character.	   But	   with	   this	   fuller	  
characterization	  in	  hand,	  we	  are	  now	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  articulate	  the	  sub-­‐argument	  for	  P1.	  
It	  goes	  like	  this:	  
S1 If	  HOT	  is	  true,	  m*	  (the	  HOT)	  entirely	  fixes	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience.	  
	  
S2 HOTs	  are	  thoughts.	  	  	  
	  
S3 Presentational	  character	  is	  a	  type	  of	  phenomenal	  character.	  
	  	  








S6 If	   HOTs	   do	   not	   have	   presentational	   character,	   no	   experience	   (on	   HOT)	   has	  
presentational	  character.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [S1,	  S3]	  




P1	  	  If	  HOT	  is	  true,	  no	  experience	  has	  presentational	  character.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [S5,	  S6]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Let’s	   begin	   by	   noting	   a	   few	   basic	   points.	   S2	   and	   S3	   are	   true	   by	   definition.	  While	   this	   is	   less	  
obvious,	  so	  is	  S1:	  as	  we’ll	  see,	  it	  follows	  from	  HOT	  as	  described.	  Fleshing	  out	  this	  point	  will	  be	  
the	  focus	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section.	  Finally,	  S6	  follows	  from	  S1	  and	  S3,	  but	  this	  won’t	  be	  obvious	  
until	  we	  say	  a	  bit	  more	  about	  S1.	  But	  before	  we	  address	  S1,	  let	  me	  say	  a	  bit	  about	  S4.	  	  
	   S4	   is	  key.	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  of	  understanding	  S4.	  By	  saying	  ‘thoughts	  as	  such	  do	  not	  
have	   presentational	   character’	   we	   might	   mean	   thoughts	   qua	   object	   of	   awareness	   have	   no	  
presentational	  character.	  This	  might	  be	  true,	  but	  it	   is	  beside	  the	  point	  for	  our	  purposes:	  HOTs	  
are	   only	   objects	   of	   awareness	   themselves	   in	   cases	   of	   introspective	   consciousness,	  where	  m*	  
(the	  HOT)	  is	  the	  object	  of	  a	  yet	  further	  state	  of	  higher-­‐order	  awareness	  m**	  (another	  HOT).	  But	  
we	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  introspective	  consciousness	  (yet).11	  Rather,	  when	  S4	  says	  ‘thoughts	  as	  
such	   do	   not	   have	   presentational	   character’	   what	   is	  meant	   is	   the	   objects	   of	   thought	   are	   not	  
phenomenally	  presented	  in	  awareness.12	  Of	  course,	  if	  S4	  just	  said	  ‘(first-­‐order)	  thoughts	  do	  not	  
have	  presentational	  character’,	  we	  would	  be	  warranted	  in	  assuming	  S4.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  what	  S4	  
says.	   It	   says	   that	   thoughts	   simpliciter—i.e.	   HOTs	   included—do	   not	   have	   presentational	  
character.	  So,	  since	  the	  object	  of	  a	  HOT	  is	  a	  first-­‐order	  state	  and	  its	  content,	  even	  if	  that	  first-­‐
order	   state	   is	   a	   perceptual	   one,	   if	   HOTs	   are	   not	   suitably	   different	   from	   ordinary	   first-­‐order	  
thoughts	  there	  is	  no	  hope	  for	  presentational	  phenomenology:	  none	  of	  the	  features	  that	  figure	  
into	  the	  higher-­‐order	  content	  will	  be	  presented	  to	  the	  subject.	  Or	  so	  I	  will	  argue.	  Naturally,	  it	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  	  I	  discuss	  the	  ramifcations	  of	  introspection	  for	  HOT	  and	  presentational	  character	  in	  §	  4.	  
12	  So	   S4	   is	   consistent	  with	   cognitive	   phenomenology	   (e.g.	   Pitt	   2004).	   S4	   only	   says	   that,	   regardless	   of	  
whatever	   phenomenal	   character	   thoughts	   may	   have,	   it	   is	   not	   presentational	   character.	   I	   discuss	  
cognitive	  phenomenology	  in	  §	  4.	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here	  that	  the	  most	  serious	  battery	  of	  objections	  will	  surface.	  To	  counter	  S4,	   the	  HOT	  theorist	  
will	  need	  to	  point	  to	  a	  feature	  of	  HOTs	  that	  could	  accommodate	  presentational	  character.	  We’ll	  
explore	  these	  options	  thoroughly	  in	  §	  4.	  	  
	   So	  let’s	  now	  turn	  back	  to	  S1.	  Like	  all	  variants	  of	  HOA	  Theory,	  HOT	  is	  usually	  interpreted	  
as	   following	   an	   object-­‐conception	   of	   state-­‐consciousness	   (Dretske	   1997).13	  The	   state	   that	   is	  
conscious	  is	  the	  lower-­‐order	  state	  m,	  i.e.	  the	  object	  of	  the	  higher-­‐order	  state	  of	  awareness	  m*.	  
But	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that—unlike	  other	  versions	  of	  HOA	  Theory—on	  HOT	  phenomenal	  character	  
is	   entirely	   fixed	   by	   m*—specifically,	   by	   the	   way	   m*	   represents	   m	   as	   being.	   On	   HOT,	  
consciousness	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  “mental	  appearance”	  (Rosenthal	  2009b:	  166),	  and	  how	  our	  mental	  
states	  appear	  to	  us	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  how	  m*	  represents	  them	  as	  being.	  	  
	   That	   the	   target	   first-­‐order	   state	  plays	  no	   role	   in	  determining	  phenomenal	   character	   is	  
made	   evident	   by	   cases	   of	   ‘radical	   misrepresentation’	   or	   ‘empty	   HOTs’,	   i.e.	   cases	   where	  m*	  
represents	  one	  as	  being	  in	  a	  state	  that	  one	  actually	  isn’t	  in.	  Take	  Karen	  Neander’s	  (1998)	  well	  –
known	   triplets	   example.	   Each	   triplet—we’ll	   call	   them	   A,	   B,	   and	   C—each	   of	   whom	   has	   an	  
assertoric	   thought	   expressible	   as	   ‘I	   have	   a	   sensation	   of	   green’	   is	   helpful	   here.	  A	   has	   a	   (first-­‐
order)	  sensation	  of	  green;	  B	  has	  a	  sensation	  of	  red;	  and	  C	  has	  an	  empty	  HOT—she	  has	  no	  first-­‐
order	   sensation	   at	   all.	   The	   question,	   then,	   is	   whether,	   on	   HOT,	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   in	   the	  
phenomenal	   character	   between	   the	   triplets’	   respective	   experiences,	   and	   further,	   whether	   C	  
actually	  has	  an	  experience	  at	  all,	  given	  that	  her	  HOT	  is	  empty.	  HOT	  says	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  As	  opposed	  to	  an	  act-­‐conception,	  as	  on	  (first-­‐order)	  representationalist	  theories	  of	  consciousness	  (see,	  
e.g.,	   Dretske	   1997).	   When	   state-­‐consciousness	   is	   identified	   with	   a	   creature's	   acts	   of	   awareness,	   the	  
creature	  need	  not	  be	  aware	  of	   these	  states	   for	   them	  to	  be	  conscious.	  What	  makes	   them	  conscious	   is	  
not,	  as	  Dretske	  puts	  it	  (ibid),	  S's	  awareness	  of	  them,	  but	  their	  role	  in	  making	  S	  conscious	  of	  something	  
else,	  e.g.	  some	  external	  object.	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character,	  and	  thus	  what-­‐it-­‐is-­‐like-­‐ness,	   for	  all	   three	  triplets	   is	  exactly	   the	  same.	   	  Here	   is	  how	  
David	  Rosenthal	  puts	  it:	  
Suppose	  my	  higher-­‐order	  awareness	  is	  of	  a	  state	  with	  property	  P,	  but	  the	  target	  isn't	  P,	  but	  
rather	  Q…A	  higher-­‐order	  awareness	  of	  a	  P	  state	  without	  any	  P	  state	  would	  be	  subjectively	  
the	  same	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  Q	  state	  occurs.	  The	  first-­‐order	  state	  can	  contribute	  nothing	  to	  
phenomenology	  apart	  from	  the	  way	  we're	  conscious	  of	  it.	  (2004:	  32)	  
	  
If	   one	   has	   a	   sensation	   of	   red	   and	   a	   distinct	   HOT	   that	   one	   has	   a	   sensation	   of	   green,	   the	  
sensation	  of	  red	  may	  nonetheless	  be	  detectable	  by	  various	  priming	  effects.	  But	  what	  it	  will	  
be	   like	  for	  one	   is	   that	  one	  has	  a	  sensation	  of	  green.	  Similarly	   if	  one	  has	  that	  HOT	  with	  no	  
relevant	  sensation	  at	  all.	  (Rosenthal	  2009a:	  249,	  emphasis	  mine)	  
	  
What	   it’s	   like	   for	   one	   [on	   HOT]	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   way	   the	   higher-­‐order	   awareness	  
represents	   the	   first-­‐order	   state…Consciousness	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   mental	   appearance…that	  
mental	  appearance	  is	  due	  solely	  to	  the	  higher-­‐order	  awareness.	  (2009b:	  166)	  
	  
Josh	  Weisberg	  concurs:	  
[W]hat	  it	   is	  to	  be	  in	  a	  conscious	  state	  is	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  oneself	  as	  being	  in	  that	  state.	  This	  
awareness,	   in	   turn,	   is	   explained	  by	  HO	   (higher-­‐order)	   representation…It	   is	   the	   intentional	  
content	  of	  the	  HO	  representation	  that	  matters	  for	  consciousness,	  not	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  
target	  first-­‐order	  state	  of	  the	  HO	  representation...	  (2011:	  439)	  	  
	  
Note	  Weisberg’s	  last	  claim.	  He	  tells	  us	  ‘[i]t	  is	  the	  intentional	  content	  of	  the	  HO	  representation	  
that	  matters	  for	  consciousness’,	  not	  consciousness	  as	  it	  is	  in	  non-­‐veridical	  cases.	  The	  content	  of	  
HOTs,	  in	  other	  words,	  fixes	  phenomenal	  character	  tout	  court.14	  
	   All	  of	  this	  follows	  from	  the	  HOT	  theorist’s	  response	  to	  Neander.	  Because	  the	  triplets	  all	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Arising	  out	  of	  these	   issues	   is	  the	  worry	  that	  on	  HOT	  we	  can	  be	   in	  conscious	  states	  that	  do	  not	  exist.	  
This	  claim	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  much	  derision	  (e.g.	  Block	  2011),	  and	  while	  some	  HOT	  theorist’s	  seem	  to	  
bite	  the	  bullet	  (e.g.	  Weisberg	  2011),	  not	  all	  do	  (e.g.	  Berger	  2014,	  see	  also	  fn.	  2).	  But	  again,	  this	  issue	  is	  
not	  to	  the	  point	  for	  us,	  as	  what	  consciousness	  is	  a	  property	  of	  and	  what	  exhausts	  phenomenal	  character	  
are	  two	  different	  issues.	  We	  only	  care	  about	  the	  latter	  here.	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have	  (i)	  the	  same	  HOT,	  (ii)	  experiences	  with	  the	  same	  phenomenal	  character,	  yet	  nevertheless	  
(iii)	  different	  content	  at	   the	   first-­‐order	   level,	   the	   first-­‐order	   level	  plays	  no	  role	   in	  determining	  
what	   it	   is	   like	   for	  A—i.e.	   the	   triplet	  with	  an	  accurate	  HOT.	  On	  HOT,	  phenomenal	   character	   is	  
determined	   by	   a	   kind	   of	   higher-­‐order	   content.	   First-­‐order	   contents	   are	   otiose	   insofar	   as	  
phenomenology	  goes.15,16	  	  
	   	   	   Further,	  we	  can	  now	  see	  how	  S6	  follows.	  Phenomenal	  character	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  kind	  
of	  higher-­‐order	  content	  (S1).	  Presentational	  character	  is	  a	  type	  of	  phenomenal	  character	  (S3).	  
But	   if	  no	  higher-­‐order	  content	   carried	  by	  a	  HOT	  determines	  any	  presentational	   character,	  no	  
experience	  has	  presentational	  character.	  	  
In	   §	   1,	   I	   remarked	   that	   the	   problem	   of	   accommodating	   presentational	   character	   is	   a	  
prima	   facie	   particularly	   trenchant	   one	   for	   HOT.	   It	   should	   now	   be	   clear	   why.	   The	   only	  
determinant	   of	   phenomenal	   character	   on	  HOT	   is	   a	   thought	   or	   thought-­‐like	   state,	   viz.	   a	  HOT.	  
Thoughts,	  by	  their	  very	  nature,	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  present	  their	  objects.	  So	  HOT	  theorists	   face	  a	  
puzzle	  that	  other	  theorists	  don’t:	  what	  is	  it	  that	  is	  special	  about	  HOTs	  such	  that	  they	  do	  (or	  can)	  
phenomenally	   present	   their	   objects,	   but	   first-­‐order	   thoughts	   do	   not?	   In	   essence,	   the	   HOT	  
theorist	  needs	  to	  show	  how	  S4	  doesn’t	  stick.	  This	  is	  the	  HOT-­‐Theoretic	  Gambit.	  
	  
4	  	  	  THE	  HOT-­‐THEORETIC	  GAMBIT	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  As	  an	  anonymous	  reviewer	  reminds	  me,	  this	  doesn’t	  mean	  such	  contents	  plays	  no	  role	  on	  traditional	  
HOT.	  Amongst	  other	  things,	  they	  play	  a	  role	  in	  perceptual	  discrimination	  (Rosenthal	  2010:	  374).	  
16 	  Kriegel	   (2009)	   describes	   first-­‐order	   content	   as	   content	   involving	   neither	   representations	   nor	  
representational	   properties.	   The	   subject	   matter	   of	   first-­‐order	   contents	   is	   the	   subject’s	   ambient	  
environment,	  including	  her	  body.	  If	  a	  content	  c	  involves	  representations	  or	  representational	  properties,	  
then	  c	  is	  not	  first-­‐order	  content,	  but	  a	  higher-­‐order	  content.	  A	  higher-­‐order	  content	  may	  be	  something	  
like	  ‘I	  am	  in	  a	  state	  with	  the	  content	  ‘the	  ball	  is	  red’;	  a	  first-­‐order	  content	  may	  be	  the	  ‘the	  ball	  is	  red’.	  On	  
self-­‐representationalism—or	  at	  least	  Uriah	  Kriegel’s	  variant	  (ibid)—phenomenal	  characters	  are	  identical	  
to	  a	  compresence	  of	  first-­‐order	  and	  higher-­‐order	  contents.	  I	  discuss	  Kriegel’s	  view	  further	  in	  §	  5.	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The	   gambit	   is	   simple.	   The	   HOT	   theorist	   points	   to	   some	   feature	   F	   of	   HOTs,	   offering	   F	   as	   a	  
candidate	  for	  the	  following	  conditional:	  S	  has	  an	  experience	  with	  some	  presentational	  character	  
φ	  if	  S	  has	  a	  mental	  representation	  m*	  (a	  HOT)	  and	  m*	  has	  F.	  Again,	  ‘candidacy’	  is	  key:	  we	  are	  
not	  looking	  for	  a	  story	  of	  how	  F	   in	  fact	  plays	  this	  role,	  or	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  F	  plays	  this	  
role.	  The	  tenor	  of	  the	  gambit	  does	  not	  require	  a	  full-­‐fleshed	  theory	  or	  an	  account,	  but	  only	  asks	  
for	   an	   F	   that	   is	   a	   possible	   candidate	   for	   such	   a	   role.	   In	   this	   regard,	   I	   want	   to	   suggest	   two	  
constraints.	  The	  first	  is	  fairly	  obvious:	  
The	   Metaphysical	   Preclusion	   Constraint	   (MPC):	   Whatever	   F	   is,	   it	   cannot	   be	   a	   feature	  
ordinary	  first-­‐order	  thoughts	  can	  possess.	  
	  
MPC	  is	  clearly	  necessary	  since	  if	  ordinary	  first-­‐order	  thoughts	  did	  posses	  F,	  and	  F	  is	  sufficient	  for	  
presentational	  character,	  than	  first-­‐order	  thoughts	  would	  have	  presentational	  character.	  But	  ex	  
hypothesis	   they	   don’t.	   An	   F	  must	   be	   such	   that	   it	   is	   the	   sort	   of	   thing	   a	   first-­‐order	   thought	   is	  
precluded	  from	  having.	  	  
	   The	   second	   constraint	   speaks	   to	   our	   datum	   that	   it	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   thoughts	   that	  
phenomenally	  present	  their	  objects.	  It	  goes	  like	  this:	  
The	   Phenomenal	   Preclusion	   Constraint	   (PPC):	  Whatever	  F	   is	   sufficient	   for	   presentational	  
character,	  when	  a	  HOT	  has	  F,	  it	  cannot	  seem	  like	  it	  is	  a	  HOT	  (i.e.	  a	  type	  of	  thought)	  that	  has	  
presentational	  character.	  	  
	  
PPC	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  misconstrued.	  It	  is	  a	  phenomenological	  datum	  that	  thoughts	  do	  not	  
seem	  to	  have	  presentational	  character.	  When	  we	  have	  a	  thought,	  the	  object	  of	  that	  thought	  is	  
not	   phenomenally	   presented	   to	   us	   in	   the	   way	   the	   objects	   of	   visual	   experience	   are	  
phenomenally	  presented.	  HOTs	  are	  a	  species	  of	  thought.	  So,	  while	  it	  may	  be	  that,	  HOTs	  are	  in	  
fact	  suitably	  different	  from	  first-­‐order	  thoughts	  such	  that	  they	  do	  phenomenally	  present	  their	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objects,	  it	  ought	  not	  seem	  to	  us	  as	  if	  they	  do.	  For	  otherwise,	  we	  would	  have	  never	  thought	  our	  
supposed	  datum	  was	  an	  actual	  datum	  to	  begin	  with.	  Even	   if	  a	   suitable	  HOT	   is	   sufficient	   (and	  
necessary)	  for	  presentational	  character,	  we	  must	  be	  ‘blind’	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  a	  thought	  that	  
has	  presentational	  character.	  I’ll	  say	  more	  on	  this	  in	  a	  bit.	  	  
	   Candidate	  Fs	  divide	   into	   three	  classes:	   (i)	  properties	  unique	   to	   the	  attitude	  of	  HOTs,	   (ii)	  
properties	   unique	   to	   the	   content	   of	   HOTs,	   and	   (iii)	   complex	   Fs,	   e.g.	   the	   conjunction	   of	   a	  
property	   unique	   to	   the	   attitude	   of	   HOTs	  with	   a	   property	   unique	   to	   the	   content	   of	   HOTs.	   I’ll	  
argue	  no	  class	  (i),	  class	  (ii),	  or	  class	  (iii)	  property	  meets	  both	  MPC	  and	  PPC.	  	  	  
	   We	   begin	   with	   class	   (i).	   HOTs	   must	   be	   assertoric,	   occurrent,	   and	   non-­‐inferential.	   Each	  
attitudinal	  property	  plays	  a	  unique	  role.	  Consider	  the	  property	  of	  being	  assertoric.	  One	  might	  
object	  HOT	  makes	  consciousness	  cheap	  (e.g.	  Balog	  2000).	  Since	  a	  suitable	  HOT	  is	  sufficient	  for	  
conscious	   experience,	   why	   bother	   going	   through	   all	   the	   trouble	   to	   seek	   pleasurable	  
experiences,	  when	  we	   can,	   as	   it	  were,	   ‘think’	   our	  way	   to	   them?	  But	   as	  Rosenthal	   points	   out	  
(2000:	  233),	  this	  is	  one	  reason	  why	  HOTs	  must	  be	  assertoric	  attitudes.	  Assertoric	  thoughts	  are	  
not	  easy	  to	  have	  just	  any	  old	  time.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  have	  thoughts	  about	  Santa	  Claus,	  but	  not	  so	  easy	  
to	   form	   an	   occurrent,	   assertoric	   thought	   that	   Santa	   Claus	   is	   here	   in	   this	   room—“really	   to	  
believe	   it,	  as	  we	  might	  say”	  (ibid).	  But	  F	  could	  not	  be	  the	  property	  of	  being	  assertoric	  for	  the	  
simple	   reason	   that	   first-­‐order	   thoughts	   can	   assertoric.	   Just	   as	   I	   can	   really	   believe	   that	   I	   see	  
Santa	  is	  coming	  down	  the	  chimney	  (a	  higher-­‐order	  assertoric	  attitude),	  I	  can	  also	  really	  believe	  
that	  Santa	  is	  coming	  down	  the	  chimney	  (a	  first-­‐order	  assertoric	  attitude).	  So	  the	  property	  being	  
assertoric	  does	  not	  meet	  MPC.	  	  
	   The	  same	  goes	  for	  being	  non-­‐inferential	  and	  being	  occurrent.	  Again	  both	  properties	  play	  a	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unique	  role	  in	  HOT’s	  setup.	  Since	  there	  can	  be	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  infers	  from	  publicly	  accessible	  
evidence	  that	  one	   is,	   for	   instance,	  angry	  without	  the	  anger	  being	  thereby	  rendered	  conscious	  
the	  HOT	  must	   be	   non-­‐inferential	   (Rosenthal	   1997:	   737).	   And	   since	   being	  merely	   disposed	   to	  
have	  a	  thought	  about	  something	  does	  not	  by	  itself	  make	  one	  conscious	  of	  it,	  the	  HOT	  must	  be	  
occurrent	   (ibid:	  742).	  But	  because	  we	  have	  non-­‐inferential	  and	  occurrent	   first-­‐order	   thoughts	  
such	   features	   cannot	   on	   their	   own	   ground	   presentational	   character	   because	   we	   have	   non-­‐
inferential	   and	   occurrent	   first-­‐order	   thoughts.	   Thus,	   the	   properties	   being	   non-­‐inferential	   and	  
being	  occurrent	  fail	  to	  meet	  MPC	  as	  well.	  	  
	   	   Let’s	  now	  turn	  to	  class	  (ii).	  One	  potential	  F	  that	  can	  be	  ruled	  out	  is	  the	  property	  of	  having	  
higher-­‐order	   content.	   Yes,	   HOTs	   (of	   course)	   do	   have	   higher-­‐order	   content,	   and	   first-­‐order	  
thoughts	  (of	  course)	  do	  not.	  So	  meeting	  MPC	  is	  not	  the	  issue.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  HOTs	  are	  not	  
always	  about	  perceptual	  states.	  Richard	  Brown	  and	  Pete	  Mandik	  (2013)	  have	  argued	  that	  if	  HOT	  
is	   true,	   we	   have	   can	   have	   (first-­‐order,	   non-­‐introspected)	   thoughts	   with	   propriety	  
phenomenology.	  Suppose	  one	   first	  has	  a	   suitable	  HOT	  about	  one’s	   first-­‐order	  pain	  sensation.	  
Here,	   the	  pain	  will	   become	   conscious.	   Yet	   now	   suppose	  one	  has	   a	   suitable	  HOT	  about	   one’s	  
thought	   that	   the	   Eiffel	   Tower	   is	   tall.	   As	   Brown	   and	  Mandik	   point	   out,	   if	   we	   deny	   cognitive	  
phenomenology,	   one	   will	   then	   need	   to	   say	   that	   though	   the	   thought	   is	   conscious,	   there	   is	  
nothing	  that	  it	  is	  like	  for	  this	  creature	  to	  consciously	  think	  the	  thought.	  But	  this	  would	  be—by	  
the	   edicts	   of	   HOT	   itself—absurd;	   after	   all,	   the	   two	   higher-­‐order	   states	   are	   in	   every	   relevant	  
respect	  the	  same.	  	  
	   Whatever	  sort	  of	  phenomenology	  cognitive	  phenomenology	  is,	  however,	  we	  can	  say	  this:	  
it	   is	   not	   presentational	   phenomenology.	   There	   are	   many	   ways	   to	   understand	   the	   cognitive	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phenomenology	  thesis	  (see,	  e.g.	  Bayne	  &	  Montague	  2011).	  Sometimes	  the	  idea	  is	  put	  in	  terms	  
of	  attitudes:	  not	  only	  there	  is	  something	  it	  is	  like	  to	  desire	  that	  P	  and	  there	  is	  something	  it	  is	  like	  
to	  believe	  that	  P,	  but	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  desire	  that	  P	  is	  different	  from	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  believe	  that	  
P.	   Sometimes	   the	   idea	   is	  put	   in	   terms	  of	   contents:	  not	  only	   is	   there	   is	   something	   it	   is	   like	   to	  
desire	  that	  P	  and	  there	  is	  something	  it	  is	  like	  to	  believe	  that	  Q,	  but	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  desire	  that	  P	  
is	  different	  from	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  desire	  that	  Q.	  Sometimes	  the	  idea	  is	  put	  in	  terms	  of	  attitudes	  
and	  contents.	  But	  bedrock	  is	  this:	  there	  is	  something	  it	  is	  like	  to	  believe	  that	  P	  and	  desire	  that	  P,	  
and	  such	  cognitive	  phenomenology	  is	  irreducible	  to	  other	  types	  of	  phenomenology.17	  The	  point,	  
I	   take	   it,	   is	   that	   cognitive	   phenomenology—whatever	   it	   is—is	   not	   like	   typical	   sensory	  
phenomenology.18	  Naturally,	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  relevant	  phenomenal	  difference	  is	  the	  
absence	   of	   presentational	   character.	   But	   given	   the	   vividness	   of	   presentational	   character,	   if	  
proponents	   of	   cognitive	   phenomenology	   were	   asserting	   that	   the	   sort	   of	   phenomenology	  
thoughts	   have	   is	   presentational,	   the	   denial	   of	   cognitive	   phenomenology	  would	   be	   perverse.	  
Presumably,	  the	  phenomenology	  is	  a	  bit	  subtler.	  
	   So	   if	   anything,	   F	   has	   to	   be	   the	   right	   sort	   of	   higher-­‐order	   content.	   This	   moves	   us	   into	  
category	  (iii):	  complex	  Fs.	  We	  know	  that	  HOTs	  have	  de	  se	  content	  since	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  that	  a	  
HOT	  represent	  a	  lower-­‐order	  state	  (say,	  a	  sensation	  of	  green)	  as	  having	  certain	  properties	  to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  In	  fact,	  all	  we	  need	  here	  is	  Pitt’s	  claim	  that	  cognitive	  phenomenology	  is	  proprietary:	  that	  what	  it	  is	  like	  
to	  think	  a	  particular	  thought	  is	  different	  from	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  in	  any	  other	  sort	  of	  conscious	  mental	  
state	  (i.e.,	  a	  sensation,	  perceptual	  experience,	  etc.).	  We	  do	  not	  require	  the	  additional	  claim	  advanced	  by	  
Pitt	  (2004:	  4)	  that	  cognitive	  phenomenology	  is	  also	  distinctive,	  i.e.	  that	  what	  it	  is	  like	  consciously	  to	  think	  
a	  particular	  thought	  is	  different	  from	  what	  it	  is	  like	  consciously	  to	  think	  any	  other	  thought.	  
18	  	  Galen	  Strawson’s	  (1994)	  notion	  of	  ‘understanding	  experience’—for	  instance,	  when	  two	  subjects	  hear	  
the	   same	   spoken	   sequence	   of	   sounds,	   yet	   one	   understands	   the	   language	   and	   the	   other	   does	   not—is	  
often	  submitted	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  cognitive	  phenomenology.	  The	   idea	   is	   that	  at	  a	  sensory	  
level	  their	  auditory	  experience	  is	  phenomenologically	  the	  same,	  but	  what	  it	   is	   like	  for	  them	  is	  still	  very	  
different.	  I	  think	  this	  is	  a	  clear	  case	  where,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  countenance	  this	  sort	  of	  phenomenology	  at	  all,	  it	  
obviously	  cannot	  be	  presentational	  in	  nature.	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conscious	  of	  that	  state	  with	  respect	  to	  those	  properties.	  We	  saw	  above	  that	  the	  HOT	  must	  also	  
represent	   the	   subject	   of	   consciousness.	   HOTs	   make	   one	   conscious	   of	   oneself	   as	   being	   in	   a	  
certain	   state	   because	   it	   has	   the	   content	   that	   one	   is,	   oneself,	   in	   that	   state	   (Rosenthal	   2004:	  
165).19	  But	  taken	  on	   it’s	  own,	  the	  property	  of	  having	  higher-­‐order	  de	  se	  content	  runs	  afoul	  of	  
the	  same	   issue	  as	  the	  property	  of	  having	  (mere)	  higher-­‐order	  content.	   I	  can	  have	  a	  HOT	  with	  
the	  content	  ‘I	  am	  thinking	  that	  Eiffel	  Tower	  is	  tall’.	  This	   is	  higher-­‐order	  de	  se	  content,	  but	  not	  
one	  that	  is	  sufficient	  for	  presentational	  character.	  	  
	   	   I	   think	   the	   best	   bet,	   then,	   is	   something	   like	   this.	   HOTs	   represent	   first-­‐order	   states	   as	  
having	  certain	  properties,	  and	  we	  are	  (purportedly)	  conscious	  of	  those	  state	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
properties	  we	   represent	   them	  as	  having.	  Amongst	   these	  properties	  are	  qualitative	  properties	  
which,	  as	  Rosenthal	  puts	   it,	  are	  “properties	  that	  resemble	  and	  differ	   from	  other	  properties	   in	  
ways	   that	  parallel	   the	  similarities	  and	  differences	  among	  a	   range	  of	  perceptible	  properties	  of	  
physical	  objects	  or,	  for	  the	  case	  of	  bodily	  sensations,	  a	  range	  of	  bodily	  conditions	  that	  we	  can	  
sense”	  (2000:	  236).20	  For	  example,	  a	  state	  of	  seeing	  a	  red	  ball	  can	  be	  conscious	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  
HOT	  ‘I	  am	  seeing	  something	  red’;	  the	  higher-­‐order	  state	  will	  make	  us	  aware	  of	  the	  first-­‐order	  
state	   in	   respect	   to	   some	  of	   its	   some	  of	   it	  qualitative	  properties	   (here,	   redness)	  but	  not	  all	  of	  
them.	  So	  maybe	  the	  proponent	  of	  HOT	  can	  leverage	  this	  by	  saying	  something	  like	  this:	  S	  has	  an	  
experience	  with	  some	  presentational	  character	  φ	  when	  S	  has	  a	  suitable	  mental	  representation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 	  Such	   essentially	   indexical	   self-­‐reference	   is	   required	   on	   HOT.	   Here’s	   Rosenthal:	   a	   state's	   being	  
conscious	  must	  consist	  “in	  one's	  having	  a	  suitable	  thought	  that	  one	  is,	  oneself,	  in	  that	  state”	  (1997:	  741,	  
emphasis	  mine;	  cf.	  2004;	  2012:	  25)	  for	  otherwise,	  “it	  might	  turn	  out	  that	  in	  any	  particular	  case	  that	  the	  
state	  was	  a	  state	  of	  somebody	  else”	  (1997:	  750,	  fn.	  39).	  
20	  Rosenthal	   seems	   to	   use	   “mental	   quality”	   (2010)	   and	   “sensory	   quality”	   (1991)	   as	   synonymous	   with	  
‘qualitative	   properties”.	   For	   instance,	   here	   is	   his	   definition	   of	   sensory	   quality:	   “Sensory	   qualities	   are	  
properties	   of	   states	   of	   organisms,	   families	   of	   which	   bear	   certain	   systematic	   relations	   to	   families	   of	  
properties	  of	  physical	  objects	  and	  processes	  to	  which	  the	  organism	  can	  respond”	  (1991:	  26).	  This	  is	  very	  
similar	  to	  the	  definition	  given	  above.	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m*	  of	  herself	  as	  being	  in	  a	  perceptual	  state	  m	  that	  has	  a	  qualitative	  property	  φ.	  Our	  (complex)	  
F,	   then,	   is	   just	   the	   property	   of	   having	   an	   assertoric,	   occurrent,	   non-­‐inferential	   HOT	  with	   the	  
content	   that	   ‘I	   am	   seeing	   something	   [enter	   qualitative	   property]’.	  When	   a	   HOT	   has	   this	   F,	   I	  
experience	  something	  red,	  and	  its	  redness	  is	  phenomenally	  presented	  to	  me.	  	  
	   	   On	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   this	   proposal	   does	  well.	  MPC	   is	   not	   an	   issue,	   because	   no	   first-­‐order	  
thought	   has	   higher-­‐order	   content	   of	   any	   kind.	   The	   proposal	   also	   has	   the	   benefit	   of	   blocking	  
worries	   about	   distinguishing	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   we	   are	   in	   states	   with	   non-­‐
presentational	   phenomenal	   character	   and	   states	   with	   presentational	   phenomenal	   character.	  
For	   here	   the	   HOT	   represents	   one	   as	   seeing	   a	   red	   ball,	   not	   thinking	   about	   it.	   However,	   the	  
trouble	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  PPC.	  	  
	   	   To	  see	   this,	  here’s	  a	  starting	  question:	  why	  do	  we	  believe	   thoughts	   lack	  presentational	  
character,	  or	  that	  there	   is	  a	  significant	  phenomenological	  difference	  between	  the	  way	  we	  are	  
aware	  of	  an	  object	  when	  we	  think	  about	  it	  relative	  to	  when	  we	  have	  a	  visual	  experience	  of	  it?	  
The	   same	   way	   we	   know	   anything	   about	   our	   experience’s	   character:	   by	   attending	   to,	   or	  
introspecting,	  it’s	  details.	  We	  already	  saw	  above	  (§	  3)	  a	  bit	  about	  how	  introspection	  works	  on	  
HOT,	  but	  it	  will	  be	  helpful	  here	  to	  say	  a	  bit	  more	  now.	  	  
	   	   HOTs	  are	  not	  always	  conscious.	  A	  HOT	  m*	  is	  conscious	  only	  when	  it	  is	  the	  object	  of	  yet	  
another	   HOT	   m**.	   When	   this	   happens,	   we	   are	   introspectively	   conscious.	   But	   what	   is	   the	  
phenomenal	   character	   of	   introspectively	   conscious	   experiences	   on	   HOT?	   It’s	   not	   identical	   to	  
any	  first-­‐order	  content,	  like	  ‘the	  ball	  is	  red’.	  It	  cannot	  be,	  since	  we	  know	  that	  first-­‐order	  content	  
are	  always	  unconscious	  on	  HOT.	  On	  HOT,	  phenomenal	  character	   is	   identical	   (or	  at	   least	   fixed	  
by)	  to	  the	  higher-­‐order	  content	  of	  a	  HOT—something	  like,	  say,	  ‘I	  am	  seeing	  that	  the	  ball	  is	  red’.	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Now,	   if	   the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	   introspectively	  conscious	  experiences	  on	  HOT	  were	  also	  
identical	   to	   those	   sorts	   of	   higher-­‐order	   contents,	   there’d	   be	   no	   threat	   to	   PPC.	   For	   then	  
introspection	  would	  only	  reveal	  the	  fact	  that	  one,	  oneself,	  was	  seeing	  a	  red	  ball.	  Nothing	  more,	  
nothing	   less:	  no	  hint	  that	   it	  was	  a	  thought	  that	  carried	  such	  content.	  Alas,	   it	   is	  not.	  When	  we	  
introspect	  on	  HOT,	  m**	  has	  what	  we	  might	  call	  a	  third-­‐order	  content,	  a	  species	  of	  higher-­‐order	  
content.	  So	  instead	  of	  introspecting	  the	  content	  ‘I	  am	  seeing	  that	  the	  ball	  is	  red’	  we	  introspect	  
something	  like	  ‘I	  am	  having	  a	  thought	  that	  I	  am	  seeing	  that	  the	  ball	   is	  red’.	  This	  is	  so	  because	  
m*—the	  HOT	  with	  which	   I	   think	   ‘I	   am	   seeing	   that	   the	  ball	   is	   red’—is	   now	   itself	   an	  object	   of	  
awareness.	  But	  now	  PPC	  is	  not	  met.	  For	  when	  we	  introspect	  it	  will	  seem	  like	  thoughts	  present	  
their	  objects,	  as	  what	  we	  will	  introspect	  will	  be	  the	  HOT	  (m*)	  itself.	  	  
	   	   One	  might	  object	  that	  PPC	  begs	  the	  question	  in	  favor	  of	  S4	  and	  against	  HOT.	  In	  effect,	  I	  
am	  insisting	  that	  first-­‐order	  thoughts	  both	  seem	  like	  they	  do	  not	  have	  presentational	  character	  
and	  not	  actually	  have	  presentational	  character,	  while	  making	  it	  a	  constraint	  that	   if	  HOTs	  have	  
presentational	  character,	  it	  cannot	  seem	  like	  they	  do	  upon	  introspection.	  Is	  this	  fair?	  I	  think	  it	  is.	  
Think	   of	   the	   situation	   this	   way.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   accommodating	   presentational	   character,	  
HOT	   is	   at	   a	   disadvantage	   from	   the	   get-­‐go.	   On	   their	   view,	   phenomenal	   character,	   and	   thus	  
presentational	   character,	   is	   fixed	   by	   content	   of	   a	   type	   of	   thought,	   a	   HOT.	   But	   it	   is	   a	  
phenomenological	  datum	  that	  thoughts	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  presentational	  character.	  So	  the	  
HOT	   theorists	   faces	   the	   challenge	   of	   showing	   how	   thoughts	   have	   presentational	   character	  
without	  making	   it	   seem	   like	   it	   is	   a	   thought	   that	   is	   phenomenally	   presenting	   its	   object.	   Yet	   if	  
HOTs	   did	   have	   presentational	   character,	   given	   how	   introspection	   works	   on	   HOT,	   it	   would	  
invariably	  seem	  like	  HOTs	  present	  their	  object	  whenever	  we	  introspect.	  But	  it	  doesn’t	  seem	  this	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way.	  If	   it	  did,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  puzzle	  to	  begin	  with—the	  gambit	  would	  be	  unnecessary.	  We	  
would	  just	  say,	  ‘well,	  first-­‐order	  thoughts	  don’t	  present	  their	  objects,	  but	  HOTs	  do,	  so	  they	  must	  
be	  suitably	  different,	  never	  mind	  what	  that	  suitable	  difference	  is.’	  In	  a	  way,	  this	  reflects	  the	  two	  
poles	  of	  our	  datum.	  Our	  datum	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  metaphysical	  claim	  that	  
Metaphysical	  Datum:	  First-­‐order	  thoughts	  do	  not	  have	  presentational	  character,	   i.e.,	  they	  
do	  not	  phenomenally	  present	  their	  objects.	  
	  
But	  also	  the	  broader	  phenomenological	  claim	  that	  
Phenomenological	  Datum:	  Thoughts	  as	  such	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  presentational	  character,	  
i.e.,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  thought	  that	  is	  phenomenally	  presenting	  its	  object.	  
	  
MPC	  is	  meant	  to	  reflect	  our	  Metaphysical	  Datum;	  PPC	  is	  meant	  to	  reflect	  our	  Phenomenological	  
Datum.	  And	  note	  the	  difference	  in	  scope.	  If	  the	  Metaphysical	  Datum	  ‘said	  thoughts	  as	  such’	  we	  
would	  beg	   the	  question	  against	  HOT	   in	   light	  of	  our	  dialectical	  constraints;	  The	  HOT-­‐Theoretic	  
Gambit,	  like	  other	  gambits,	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  no	  theory	  has	  a	  leg	  up	  on	  explaining	  
why	  experiences	  have	  presentational	  character.	  All	  we	  can	  claim,	  confidently,	  is	  that	  first-­‐order	  
thoughts	  do	  not	  have	   such	   characters,	   and	   that	   if	  HOTs	  do	   have	  presentational	   character—if	  
they	  phenomenally	  present	  their	  objects—when	  we	  introspect	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  like	  we	  have	  a	  
thought	   (here,	   a	  HOT)	  with	  presentational	   character.	   So	   employing	  PPC	   in	   the	   service	  of	   our	  
modus	   tollens	   begs	   no	   salient	   questions.	   Only	   if	   PPC	   precluded	   HOTs	   from	   having	  
presentational	  character	  would	  the	  question	  be	  begged.	  MPC	  so	  precludes	  first-­‐order	  thoughts,	  
but	  that	  is	  neither	  here	  nor	  there.	  	  
	   Finally,	  note	  there	  is	  no	  recourse	  in	  suggesting	  that	  what	  this	  argument	  demonstrates,	  if	  
anything,	  is	  that	  presentational	  character	  is	  just	  impossible	  on	  HOT	  qua	  theory	  of	  introspection,	  
not	  HOT	  qua	  theory	  of	  consciousness;	  jettison	  HOT’s	  story	  of	  introspection,	  and	  pressure	  from	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PPC	  evaporates.	   For	   these	   theories	  are	   really	   two	   sides	  of	   the	   same	  coin.	   Even	   if	  we	  did	  not	  
want	  to	  call	  what	  happens	  when	  we	  have	  a	  third-­‐order	  state	  (m**)	  directed	  at	  a	  higher-­‐order	  
thought	   ‘introspection,’	  when	  we	  did	  have	  such	  a	  m**,	  we	  would	  still	  be	  aware	  that	   it	  was	  a	  
thought	  that	  was	  ‘doing’	  the	  presenting.	  And	  rejecting	  that	  we	  could	  have	  an	  m**	  about	  an	  m*	  
in	  this	  way	  would	  simply	  be	  ad	  hoc	  absent	  independent	  reason	  to	  think	  otherwise.	  	  
	  
5	  	  	  CLOSING	  THOUGHTS	  
Here	  is	  where	  we	  are.	  The	  HOT	  theorist	  is	  forced	  to	  find	  some	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  HOTs	  that	  
can	  possibly	   ground	  presentational	   character,	  without	   running	   afoul	   of	  MPC	   and	  PPC.	  We’ve	  
found	   none.	  Of	   course,	   our	   argument	   is	   only	   conclusive	   if	   the	   features	   canvassed	   above	   are	  
jointly	  exhaustive,	  but	  at	  least	  insofar	  as	  traditional	  HOT	  goes,	  I	  know	  of	  no	  others.	  	  
An	   obvious	   next	   step	   is	   to	   look	   at	   non-­‐traditional	   variants	   of	   HOT.	   To	   close,	   here’s	   a	  
suggestion:	   let	  first-­‐order	  contents	  play	  a	  role	   in	  determining	  phenomenal	  character.	  Kriegel’s	  
self-­‐representational	  theory	  presents	  a	  useful	  model	  here	  (2009).	  On	  his	  account,	  phenomenal	  
character	   is	   a	   compresence	   of	   higher-­‐order	   and	   first-­‐order	   contents.	  We	   can	   co-­‐opt	   this	   by	  
letting	   the	   ‘analog’	   first-­‐order	   contents	  of	  perceptual	   states	  do	   some	  phenomenal	   lifting.	  We	  
can	  say	  that	  such	  contents	  fix	  the	  presentational	  aspects	  of	  conscious	  experience,	  while	  higher-­‐
order	   contents	   (of	   HOTs)	   fix	   the	   non-­‐presentational	   aspects.	   A	   HOT,	   on	   this	   view,	   is	   still	  
necessary	  for	  conscious,	  because	  (the	  idea	  goes)	  all	  conscious	  states	  include	  non-­‐presentational	  
phenomenal	  character.	  This	  comports	  well	  with	   the	  HOT	  theorist’s	  antecedent	  commitments,	  
as	   they	   are	   already	   committed	   to	   a	   non-­‐presentational	   form	   of	   self-­‐awareness	   being	   a	  
necessary	   condition	   on	   a	   state’s	   being	   conscious—we	   are	   aware	   of	   ourselves	   as	   being	   in	   a	  
certain	  state	  (Rosenthal	  2004).	  Since	  (i)	  conscious	  states	  are	  still	  states	  we	  are	  conscious	  of	  (not	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with),	   (ii)	   the	   higher-­‐order	   state	   of	   awareness	   is	   still	   a	   HOT,	   and	   (iii)	   there	   is	   no	   constitutive	  
relationship	   between	   the	   HOT	   and	   the	   first-­‐order	   state,	   this	   does	   not	   amount	   to	   a	   massive	  
abandonment	  of	  traditional	  HOT.21	  And	  MPC	  and	  PPC	  are	  non-­‐issues,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  the	  content	  
of	  a	  thought	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  presentational	  character.	  
So	   maybe	   this	   isn’t	   too	   steep	   a	   price	   to	   pay	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   presentational	  
character.	  But	  then	  again,	  we	  are	  buying	  just	  that—possibility.	  Is	  this	  worth	  it?	  I	  don’t	  know,	  but	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21	  I	   am	   not	   implying	   that	   attempts	   to	   accommodate	   presentational	   character	   with	   a	   broadly	   HOT-­‐
theoretic	   explanation	  must	   appeal	   to	   first-­‐order	   contents	   in	   this	   way.	   Other	   non-­‐traditional	   variants	  
might	  start	  with	  emendations	  to	  the	  HOTs	  themselves.	  Consider	  Millar’s	  (2014:	  249)	  recent	  extension	  of	  
a	   proposal	   made	   by	   Searle	   (1983:	   48).	   Searle	   claims	   that	   when	   you	   have	   a	   visual	   experience	   of	   a	  
particular	  object	  your	  visual	  experience	  represents	  that	  object	  as	  causing	  that	  very	  experience,	  and	  this	  
is	  sufficient	  for	  presentational	  character.	  Yet	  as	  Millar	  points	  out,	  this	  won’t	  do,	  because	  a	  thought	  about	  
a	   particular	   object	   can	   represent	   that	   the	   relevant	   object	   is	   causing	   that	   very	   thought	   and	   still	   lack	  
presentational	   character.	   The	   patch,	  Millar	   suggests,	   is	   to	   say	   that	   visual	   experiences	   represent	   their	  
objects	  as	  the	  direct	  cause	  of	  that	  very	  experience	  (because	  thoughts,	  Millar	  claims,	  do	  not	  bear	  a	  direct	  
causal	  link	  to	  their	  objects).	  The	  HOT	  theorist	  might	  run	  with	  this	  idea	  saying,	  for	  instance,	  when	  I	  have	  a	  
visual	   experience	   of	   a	   red	   apple,	   the	   content	   of	   my	   HOT—identical	   to	   the	   phenomenal	   (i.e.	  
presentational)	  character	  of	   that	  experience—would	  be	   ‘I	  am	  seeing	  a	   red	  apple	  and	  this	   [experience,	  
seeing]	   directly	   causally	   depends	   on	   the	   apple’s	   being	   red.’	  One	  problem	  with	   this	   proposal	   is	   that	   it	  
makes	  accommodating	  presentational	  character	  in	  conceptually	  unsophisticated	  creatures	  far	  less	  likely.	  
For	  now	   such	   creatures	  would	  not	  only	  have	   to	  employ	   (and	   thus	  possess)	   the	   concept	  CAUSE	   in	   the	  
higher-­‐order	  content,	  but	  the	  complex	  concept	  DIRECT	  CAUSE.	  Naturally,	  this	  is	  an	  empirical	  matter,	  but	  
even	  if	  the	  former	  concept	  can	  be	  possessed	  by	  the	  conceptually	  unsophisticated,	  the	  latter	  will	  prima	  
facie	   be	   a	   much	   tougher	   sell.	   But	   more	   important	   given	   the	   thread	   of	   this	   paper,	   this	   option	   does	  
nothing	   to	   touch	   PPC.	   Since	   it	   is	   still	   a	   HOT	   that	   is	   fixing	   pheneomenal	   (and	   thus	   presentational	  
character),	  we	  can	  still	  have	  a	  further	  third-­‐order	  thought	  that	  represents	  ourselves	  as	  being	  in	  (the	  first)	  
HOT.	  The	  general	  lesson,	  then,	  is	  that	  however	  we	  emend	  the	  traditional	  HOT-­‐theoretic	  explanation,	  we	  
either	  (i)	  find	  some	  way	  of	  meeting	  PPC	  within	  HOT’s	  current	  account	  of	  introspection,	  or	  (ii)	  find	  some	  
non	   ad	  hoc	   adjustment	  of	  HOT’s	   account	   of	   introspection	   that	   precludes	  us	   from	  being	   aware	  of	   our	  
HOT’s	  as	  thoughts.	  
22	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  two	  anonymous	  referees,	  Mahrad	  Almotahari,	  Richard	  Brown,	  Jessica	  Gottlieb,	  Saja	  
Parvizian,	  and	  especially	  David	  Hilbert	  for	  helpful	  comments	  on	  previous	  drafts.	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